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mortgage, however, has disadvantages. It is recorded by the mercan-
tile agencies in the credit records and reports upon which prospective
creditors place so much reliance and it is regarded as an indication of
financial weakness, perhaps because a blanket chattel mortgage is so
often used by a distressed borrower primarily to give additional secur-
ity for old advances. It also almost universally requires recordation,
which delays considerably the operation of arranging credit. The use
of devices technically giving the mortgagee legal possession, such as
the placing of signs with the mortgagee's name on the merchandise and
the segregation of the goods, indicate the dislike of the necessity of
recordation. The conditional sale is not viewed with suspicion by the
credit authorities, but it, too, quite generally'needs recordation. Where
conditional sales do not require recordation, that fact is often sufficient
to result in the use of that device. The universal acceptance of the
proposed uniform laws would aid in clearly determining the fields to
which each of the security methods is best fitted.
CONSIDERATION FOR PROMISES BY A GRATUITOUS BAILEE
The New York Court of Appeals has just held in Siegel v. Spear
& Co. (1923) 68 N. Y. L. Jour. 1847, that a gratuitous bailee is bound
to pay damages for breach of his promise to effect insurance on the
articles in his care. The plaintiff was a purchaser of furniture on the
installment plan, the defendant being the seller with a chattel mortgage
as security. For the convenience of the plaintiff, the defendant under-
took to store the furniture free of charge during the summer and
promised to have it insured for the plaintiff's benefit, the cost thereof
to be paid later by the plaintiff. The furniture was burned without
having been insured.
The court held that the surrender of possession of the goods was a
sufficient consideration for the promise, and on this ground distin-
guished several cases in which promises to insure were held to be with-
out consideration and void.' This distinction has been thought to be
of little weight, inasmuch as the surrender of possession in the gratu-
itous bailment is not exchanged for the defendant's promise to insure.2
Thus in 'Thorne v. Deas (I o, N. Y.) 4 Johns. 84, one of two joint owners of
a vessel promised the other to have it insured. He failed to keep his promise,
and the vessel was lost at sea. In Brawm v. Lyford (19o7) 103 Me. 362, 69 Atl.
54, a vendor promised his vendee to have certain insurance policies then in the
vendor's possession properly assigned to the vendee. The promise was not kept,
and later the buildings were burned. In these cases there was no bailment of
goods.
'Thus Professor Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 138, says: "Allowing another
to act as a gratuitous agent, bailee, or trustee, is a detriment which may support
the promise of the agent, bailee, or trustee. The difficulty, however, is that the
parties ordinarily in a gratuitous transaction do not in fact exchange the promise
for this permission."
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In all these cases alike there was action or forbearance in reliance
upon the promise, fully as important in character as any mere sur-
render of possession. Of course, a gratuitous bailee has certain
duties in the absence of any promise, the bailee being suable in an
action of tort. The bailee has been said to be liable only for a mis-
feasance, not for a nonfeasance. This distinction is not worth much
either, 3 because negligence is usually nonfeasance; and yet a bailee is
liable for negligence causing injury to the property. He must, of
course, have taken the article into his possession, for otherwise he
does not become a bailee. It has sometimes been believed that a gra-
tuitous bailee's duties are not contractual and that they cannot be
increased by mere promissory words ;4 but there is ample authority in
support of the contrary view.'
See the remarks of Collins, L. J., in Turner v. Stallibrass [1898] 1 Q. B. 56, 59.
42 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (19o6) 49: "Upon principle the
distinction appears to be this: The mandatary is liable for a misfeasance of the
mandate if the right of action can be brought within the principle of actions for
negligence, but not otherwise . . . . the right of action for negligence is limited
to situations where damage is negligently done to person or property. It follows
that the right of action for misfeasance on the part of a mandatary is limited to
situations where his misfeasance results in physical hurt or damage to property.
If I deliver my liquors to a man to convey from one place to another and he is to
do it for nothing, he will be liable for breaking one of the casks if he is chargeable
with negligence. Coggs v. Bernard (703, K. B.) 2 Ld. Raym. 9o9. So a carrier
of passengers is liable for a negligent injury to a passenger, although the latter is
being conveyed without compensation." Williston, loc. cit. sapra note 2: "The
discussions in regard to this question show that the true nature of the liability is
not contractual, for, if it were, the .only question would be-what was the defen-
dant's promise."
'In Wilkinson v. Coverdale (793) I Esp. 75, a buyer sued the seller for breach
of a promise to have certain existing insurance transferred to the buyer, the seller
having brought about a defective transfer. Lord Kenyon thought that the case
fell within the "misfeasance" doctrine and allowed the case to go to the jury.
In Whitehead v. Greetham (1825, C. P.) 2 Bing. 464, the plaintiff deposited ;7oo
with the defendant and the latter promised to buy therewith a well-secured
annuity. The defendant was adjudged to pay damages for buying an annuity that
failed through insolvency. In Robinson v. Threadgill (851) 35 N. C. 39,
an action was sustained for breach of a gratuitous promise by the defendant to
collect notes put into his possession by the plaintiff. See also Hart v. Miles
(1858) 4 C. B. (N. s.) 571; McCauley v. Davidson (1865) 1o Minn. 418; Clark v.
Gaylord (1856) 24 Conn. 484. In Car? v. Maine Central Ry. (917) 78 N. H.
402, 1o2 At. 532, the defendant promised that if the plaintiff would execute the
necessary papers the defendant would forward them to the Interstate Commerce
Commission in time for the allowance of a rebate. For breach of this promise the
court sustained "Case for negligence." The court said that the declaration
"sounds in tort"; but in fact the only "tort" committed was that for which
special assumpsit was invented-the breach of an express promise relied on by
the plaintiff.
Sir William Anson (Contracts, Corbin's ed. 1919, sec. 133) agrees entirely with
the instant decision. He recognizes that the action must be ex contractu and
suggests that such cases are exceptions to the "universal application" of the
English doctrine of consideration. It is believed, however, that the "doctrine"
should be so expanded in its statement as to include such "exceptions."
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In the instant case the defendant's duty can be regarded as con-
tractual only. A mere gratuitous bailee is under no duty to insure.
It is believed that the decision is sound, but that it must rest upon the
principle that certain types of reliance upon a promise make it binding
without any other consideration. A surrender of possession is one
of these types, but the principle should not be restricted to cases of
bailment of goods.6
A. L. C.
EFFECT OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
Despite the.common occurrence of mortgage transactions, the courts
are still confused as to what legal relations arise from a mortgage.'
Confusion increases, moreover, when a mortgage transaction involves
other questions of law.
In the case of Pratt v. Pratt (1922, Wash.) 2o9 Pac. 535, a son
purchased land taking title in the name of his father by a deed absolute
on its face. In fact the deed was given as security for a debt not evi-
denced by writing, owing from the son to the father. The statute
of limitations for such a debt in Washington is three years. The father,
after the debt was barred, brought suit against the son's widow, to
have the deed declared a mortgage and foreclosed. It was held (four
judges dissenting) first, that the conveyance was intended as security
for a debt and hence that the deed should be considered as a mortgage;
secondly, since.a mortgage is merely security for a debt, it is a mere
incident thereof and therefore, the debt being barred, the mortgage is
barred also. The court therefore denied any relief to the plaintiff.
The case presents a threefold complication: (I) a deed absolute
intended as a mortgage; (2) a debt barred by the statute of limitations;
and (3) relief sought by the mortgagee.
The instant case is in accord with the general rule, both in jurisdic-
tions where a mortgage conveys legal title and in those states where it
creates merely a lien, that a deed absolute on its face will be declared
to be a mortgage2 if there is clear and convincing evidence3 that the par-
'It might well include Thorne v. Deas and Brawn v. Lyford, supra. See Anson,
op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 127, note I. Indeed, in the present case the court says of
Thorne v. Dear: "Whether or not we would feel bound to follow it today must
be left open until the question comes properly before us."
'Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of The Lien Theory (1923) 32 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 233.
*Title states: Linkeinann v. Knepper (1907) 226 Ill. 473, So N. E. l09;
Cullen v. Carey (1886) 146 Mass. 50, 15 N. E. 131. Lien states: DeLeonis v.
Walsh (19o3) i4O Calif. 175, 73 Pac. 823; Teal v. Scandinavian-Aimerican Bank
(911) 114 Minn. 435, 131 N. W. 486; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th
ed. 1918) 2840; see L. P. A. 1916 B, i8-6io, note.
33 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 2, 2846, note; (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
i85.
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